Introduction
Terrorism dates back to ancient times. Europeans have experienced terrorism in many forms in recent decades. Meant to be a comprehensive and cooperative response on the part of 2 governments, counter-terrorism seeks to combat this menace. Dating back to the end of the nineteenth century, contemporary counter-terrorism has included a wide range of short-and long-term measures exercised at home and abroad.
There are volumes of research on counter-terrorism, with a number of authors who present various methodological approaches when analysing this phenomenon. In the 1980s, Marc
Calmer asserted that 'antiterrorism actions are designed as defensive measures to prevent the occurrence of terrorism as opposed to counterterrorist measures, which are offensive in nature and are designed to respond to a terrorist act ' (1987, p. 13 ). Yet, after 9/11 the evolution of counter-terrorism seems to have falsified such a simplistic dichotomy.
Contemporary counterterrorist strategies are comprehensive, multilayered and holistic responses. Consequently Robert Art and Louise Richardson (2007) make a fine point dividing counterterrorist measures into three groups: political, legislative and judicial and security (2007, pp. 16-17) . A widely used typology of defensive and offensive measures includes physical protection of different levels from individual sites to entire country, diplomacy, financial control and intelligence (defensive), law enforcement and military force (offensive) (Pillar 2008, pp. 376-388) . Martin van Creveld (2007, pp. 157-174) and Rohan Gunaratna (2007, pp. 175-200) represent another approach, emphasising the need for an integrated path in counter-terrorism policies.
Analysing the examples of Israeli counter-terrorism, van Creveld postulates the importance of defensive measures such as security fences. Gunaratna, on the other hand, stresses the importance of international co-operation against both domestic and international terrorism.
Others analyse the feasibility of particular counter-terrorist measures by studying the roots of terrorism. Rob Imre challenges the notion that it is possible to pinpoint simple causality within a sociopolitical phenomenon such as terrorism (2008b, pp. 7-18) . He analyses four concepts (outside religious issues) that are pertinent to political violence such as terrorism, 3 namely, poverty, evil, statecraft and modernity. Ben Clarke, writing in the same edited volume (2008, pp. 19-57) , focuses on the legal context of terrorism, and claims that it is often caused by the violation of human rights and the rule of law. Other legal aspects embrace the failure of states and International Organizations (IOs) to cooperate and produce a just resolution to conflicts. The legal approach emphasizes general compliance with the international rule of law, international human rights norms and international cooperation in the implementation of the Security Council's resolutions on counter-terrorism. Bolz et al. when analysing US counter-terrorist responses, distinguish three discrete levels: local, state and federal (2002, p. 11) . Each of them elicits responses from various participants such as medical personnel up to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Anne Speckhard takes civil society as the main point of interest and emphasizes its capacity not only to absorb but also to address the roots of terrorism as having 'the best chance of defusing the bombs that may go off by robbing the terrorists of their basis of existence ' (2005, pp. 113-123) . Along similar lines, Frank Gregory writes about the private sector and its role in counter-terrorism activities (2007, pp. 321-330) . He asserts that the so-called private sector has a vital role to play as a potential contributor of human resources to the counter-terrorist response.
This paper explores the topic of counter-terrorism from a similar perspective. In contrast to many studies, including those mentioned above, the aim of the author is to emphasise the role of the public in preventing, protecting and preparing for terrorist attacks. The first part lays down premises and a rationale for such an approach. The second, third and fourth parts provide particular examples supporting such tenets in the case of the United Kingdom. Later, an overall theoretical framework is developed in order to support the feasibility of such an approach. to challenge a socio-political problem will result in possible post fiwto punishments of groups or individuals engaged in violent conduct, but will act as a deterrent measure for these groups in only a very limited manner.'
Whatever the character of new terrorism, its effects are always also local. According to 'London Prepared' major incidents such as 9/11 have profound impact on local businesses.
Consequently, 80 per cent of businesses affected by a major incident close within 18 months.
90 per cent of those businesses that lose data from a disaster are forced to shut within two years. 58 per cent of UK organizations were disrupted by September 11, one of eight being seriously affected (Gregory 2007, p. 322) .
Social mobilization 8
The following is an account, by no means full, of some of the initiatives run by the British authorities and aimed at tackling terrorist threats with a non-classic/non-state approach. This short extract reflects the main idea increasingly promoted in the UK and consequently analysed in this paper: should counter-terrorism prove effective, civilians need to be engaged.
Official documents provide many examples of declared accommodation of civilians into
counter-terrorist activities on the part of the government. In the eyes of the authorities, the private sector -including voluntary and community organisations, education and youth groups, arts and media as well as academia -is an indispensible element in effective counterterrorism.
In recent years, most major terrorist incidents have involved not the seizure of hostages and threat of inflicting harm on them but instead the direct and unprovoked killing of innocent people, usually with bombs. Therefore, since negotiating with Jäit accompli is impossible, the efforts of governments have logically shifted to prevention.
Since 2003, the British Government has had a counter-terrorist strategy that goes by the name 'CONTEST'. (In March 2009, the first major revision of this strategy was published.)
'CONTEST' consists of four key elements: Pursue to stop terrorist attacks: Prevent to stop 9 people becoming terrorists or supporting violent extremism: Protect to strengthen protection against terrorist attacks; and Prepare -where an attack cannot be stopped, to mitigate its impact (HM Government 2009b). All of these key elements have to be realised overseas as well as at home; that is, within the borders of the UK.
Prevent
At home it is much easier to operate for the obvious reason of political conditions sovereignty.
'Prevent' is by far the most important part of the British counter-terrorism strategy. About £140m is being spent annually on 'Prevent' programmes, many of them administered by local authorities. Some more sensitive projects come under direct Whitehall control.
'Prevent' is about preventing people from supporting violent extremism and the ideology that fuels terrorism. This part falls under the traditional British approach of engaging communities.
In the UK, communities are viewed as an important resource for tackling social problems like crime, anti-social behaviour or unemployment. 6 As Rachel Briggs rightly observes: 'It is true that the terrorist threat comes from a tiny and marginal minority, but these individuals are integrated within their communities and not, on the whole, loners working on their own. This is why communities need to play a central role in many different areas of the ounterterrorism strategy. a principle that is now implicit within government policy. (Briggs 2010, p. 972) .'
From that perspective, communities in general and Muslim communities in particular might appear to be well suited to act against radicalisation, especially of young British Muslims (Report on Wilton Park Conference WPSO6/5 2006). The main idea here, which some call wishful thinking, is that 'Prevent' is basically a challenge to win minds and hearts. If so,
Muslims are expected to be much more trusted by other 'brothers' in faith than the 'infidels' ever would be. In that respect the 'Prevent' strategy identifies one of its objectives as 'Increasing the capacity of communities to resist violent extremism'. 
Protect and Prepare
For the purpose of this paper the 'Protect and Prepare' elements of CONTEST should be analysed together, since they deal with terrorist attacks as such and are in reality somewhat indistinguishable. 'Prepare' means 'to mitigate the consequences of an attack' and 'Protect' means 'to strengthen the defence against an attack'. Without good preparation for counterterrorism, there can be no protection. So 'Protect' is not only a precondition, but to a large extent can only be measured against 'Prepare'.
Of the four strands of the counter-terrorism strategy under 'Protect', three are particularly pertinent to the initiative of 'civilianisation' of security analysed in this paper: (I) protecting key utilities, (2) making the public transport system safer and (3) protecting crowded places.
These are areas where the private sector is being increasingly engaged as a partner with government bodies. This relates also to the infrastructure that the Home Office refers to as the One example of this is engaging architects and planners to design future buildings and public places that are safer and better protected. Industry in general is involved in designing improved materials, ranging from tougher glass that stops broken pieces from flying in an explosion, which is a major cause of injury and deaths, to bollards and barriers that can withstand the impact of a speeding truck (HM Government 2010c). According to the government response to the consultation document on crowded places, greater partnership is required in the future at the local level. Also, in the long-term, developers are expected to respond positively to the challenges of including counter-terrorist measures at the earliest stage of the design process (HM Government 2010b).
The Office for Security and Counter-terrorism recently launched a competition to encourage student architects and designers to find new solutions to deal with the threat of vehicle-borne terrorist attacks. 12 Apart from the early stages, such as design, much more is being done with regards to helping the private sector develop its own responses to terrorist events. Project 'Argus', to use an example, is an initiative that encourages hotels to develop their own bespoke counter-terrorism security plans. The programme helps hotels prevent terrorist attacks, handle their response should an event happen and recover from it afterwards. 
333-353).
At the other end of the spectrum, there is the question of home security. As the general truth goes, one cannot have security and freedom at the same time, so we encounter the need to balance trade-offs between the two. Obviously, tighter security measures, such as 'stop and search' procedures, 28-day detentions of terrorist suspects without charge or body scanners at 16 airports. may make many feel that their freedom is compromised. 22 Arguments referring to a genuine need of policing and intelligence institutions with 'extended powers' to provide the quality of services they are supposed to provide, lead contemporary societies to the 'state of emergency/ exceptionalism' or what Didier Bigo terms as 'the ban-opticon dispositif ' (2008, p. 31) . We can disagree about the extent of the limitations to our freedoms, but the essential paradox seems to be inescapable. There is no simple way out of this predicament. Therefore, 'civilianisation' of security, at least as far as counterterrorism at home is concerned, may present policy-makers with a chance to mitigate the harsh effects of having to choose between security and freedom.
There are a number of reasons for which civilians would be quite well suited for the task of acting against terrorism, perhaps better than a public institution, First, public institutions are quite immobile. Usually understaffed, underinvested and underequipped policing and to a lesser extent intelligence agents cannot prevent, prepare and protect civilians effectively in case of terrorist threats and attacks. 23 No matter how sophisticated technologies get, how strict controls at the airports are and how engaged and devoted agents may be, full security remains unattainable. Penitentiary systems, for that matter, often result in contradictory effects, where those released from prison may constitute a greater threat to society than they did before serving time or who are at best no better for society after serving time. This is why recently the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) announced that it was going to publish online details including pictures, of drug traffickers, fraudsters and money launderers and encourage the public to monitor them and possibly even try to prevent them from offending again. Last, but by no means least, the UK has educated the public that terrorist attacks could become a normal part of life, 29 while at the same time conveyed the idea that a 'permanent state of exception' or 'emergency' is both omnipresent and justified (Bigo 2008. p. 31) . This indicates that we are experiencing a slow transformation of representative democracy and its erosion in favour of the development of govern mental politics without checks and balances.
The current state of transnationalisa tion of bureaucracies of surveillance and the omnipresence of high-tech surveillane techniques add to the problems rather than solve them (Bigo 2006, p. 56) .
The 'natural' focus on prevention mentioned earlier in the text brings therefore a risk of wading through apocalyptic visions often presented as a credible future by a considerably small group of experts and bureaucrats in order to justify the suspension and destruction of individual security and freedom (Bigo and Guild 2007, p. 117) . Perhaps, 'civilianisation' as understood in this paper is not a government's response to these problems, since it is the UK government that is also responsible for its creation. Yet, 'civilianisation' of security should be conceived of as an opportunity for society to counter-bureaucratic encroachments, and by constant engagement and partner-like participation within counter-terrorism policy, to normalise the emergency as a technique of 'government by unease'. That could also help to differentiate between those who are not against being monitored against danger and groups of people considered as dangerous 'others'.
Can Curative and preventive methods work?
The rising Muslim population in Europe in general and in the UK in particular may serve both as a catalyst of 'civilianisation'/privatisation of counter-terrorism policy and as an Rachel Briggs, in her article on community engagement for counter-terrorism, puts forward three significant suggestions: (1) community engagement is not something that can or should indeed be done half-heartedly, (2) one of the most important limiting factors for success is the extent to which the local authority understands and has solid relationships with its local communities and (3) the lines need to be drawn more clearly between activities aimed at preventing violent extremism and those seeking to achieve broader aims in order to guard against the creeping securitisation of all manner of areas of policy (Briggs 2010, pp. 980-981) .
She asserts that community development workers, teachers, social workers and mental health practitioners are not counter-terrorism practitioners, although they undoubtedly have a 22 contribution to make. Indeed this paper also contradicts the idea of 'creeping securitisation' of everyday life activities. As first outlined by Ole Waever, securitisation is a process in which an actor declares a particular issue, dynamic or actor to be an 'existential threat' to a particular referent object (1995) . If accepted by the relevant audience, this enables the suspension of normal politics and the use of emergency measures in responding to that perceived crisis.
On the contrary, 'civilianisation', if understood and promoted properly, is far from 'securitisation' of everyday life activities. Since it emphasises the need to include vast parts of society into coordinated actions against perceived threats, in this case terrorist attacks, the danger of 'suspension of normal politics' is mitigated. By engaging civilians in some aspects of counter-terrorist measures, governments may not only boost a sense of burden sharing but also open themselves more to the criticism and control of the public. Enlarging the stakeholder base will in this sense bring more transparency to public policies and, therefore, potentially more accountability.
Leaving the disputes between the proponents of the Copenhagen School of constructivist tradition and the so-called Welsh School of critical security studies behind, this paper alludes to a simple, yet powerful concept of emancipation (Booth 1991, p. 319 Departing from such a concept, it logically follows that 'civilianisation' of security in the context of counter-terrorism implies thinking about individuals as ultimate security referents.
If this is so, then it further conduces to the notion that 'civilianisation' may be conceived of as a means to achieving ultimate and relatively full security of human beings in a world where 'world order' between people is more fundamental and primordial than that of states.
Conclusion
There is a fundamental distinction between 'civilianisation' of security (as envisaged by the British government and analysed in this paper) and civil defence. The latter is widely understood as the organisation and training of civilians for the protection of lives and property during and after attacks in wartime. Recently the notion of civil defence has been evolving. The term 'civil protection' is currently popularly used within the European Union to refer to government-approved systems and resources tasked with protecting the noncombatant population, primarily in the event of natural and technological disasters. In recent years, there has been a considerable emphasis on preparedness for technological disasters resulting from terrorist attacks as well. In most countries, however, civil defence is a government-managed activity.
Having said that, we must note first that 'civilianisation' of security refers not only to protection but also to prevention. Second, the activities under 'civilianisation are not entirely managed by the government but rather initiated and coordinated. In that sense 'civilianisation' denotes a situation where civilians are engaged in the conduct of actions traditionally carried out by states and where the actual realization of the tasks and initiatives tends to shift considerably to non-official civilians in the private sphere. Paraphrasing David Garland, the aims and benefits of such initiatives are not merely the off-loading ('hiving off') of troublesome state functions, or the privatisation of counter-terrorist measures (2001, p. 127) . Rather along the lines of responsibilisation' strategy in the field of crime control, 'civilianisation' is to be understood as spreading new forms of 'government-at-a-distance'. 34 Finally, some methodological remarks are in order. This paper did not aim at determining how far or to what extent the UK public mobilised themselves to tackle terrorist threats and even less so at attempting to measure it in any way. for obvious reasons 'civilianisation' as a social phenomenon escapes easy measurement. For that matter, it requires rather a qualitative approach. Since terrorist threats at the level of prevention are hard to spot, it seems logical to assume that the only plausible and workable solution will also be hard to measure. In that sense, a strong social/ community based response appears to be the best way to address 'the menace of the twenty-first century'. In this form of counter-terrorism, it appears that the role of governments is evolving in the direction of encouraging the environment in which such a civilian-based response might grow and flourish.
On the other hand, only time will tell how much 'civilianisation' is a living trend within British society or just another of government's ideas feasible at times of great peril but 'petering out' once the public feels safer. 2. See also: Kaplan (1994 5. 'The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom. Security in an independent world', includes large parts of CONTEST. As such, it explicitly states that 'The work of Prevent will only succeed with the active participation of the widest cross-section of society'. Likewise 'A strong Britain in an age of uncertainty: The National Security Strategy' identifies a 'need to build a much closer relationship between government, the private sector and the public when it comes to national security'.
6. See more at: Spalek and Lambert (2008) . 
